[1.x] Kontainer media

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1. FILE: kontainer.module

/**
 * @file
 * Drupal Module: Kontainer.
 */

The description for a module is Hook implementations for the [module name] module. where [module name] is the module name given in the .info.yml file.

2. The documentation comment for constructors is not mandatory anymore, If it is given, the description must be Constructs a new [class name] object. where [class name] includes the class namespace.

  /**
   * Class constructor.
   *

Function and method declarations are written on a single line.

src/Plugin/Field/FieldFormatter/KontainerCdnFormatter.php
src/Plugin/Field/FieldWidget/KontainerCdnItemWidget.php
src/Plugin/Field/FieldWidget/KontainerReferenceItemWidget.php
src/Plugin/Validation/Constraint/KontainerLinkConstraintValidator.php
src/Plugin/media/Source/KontainerFileAssetDeriver.php
src/Service/KontainerService.php
src/Form/KontainerConfigForm.php
src/Controller/KontainerController.php

Thank you for your feedback!

I have fixed everything from your list of findings. The changes have been pushed to the 1.x branch. If there is something more to do, please let me know.

docs and main are wrong names for a branch and should be removed. Release branch names always end with the literal .x as described in Release branches → .

The only exception is for the main branch, which is actually not fully supported on drupal.org and should be avoided.

Both branches have been deleted.

I am changing the issue priority as per issue priorities → .

There are a couple of the phpcs error in this file. Code looks good. No duplication of code or functionality that I could see. README.md looks good, No security vulnerabilities that I can see off hand. Moving to Reviewed and tested if no one objects.

FILE: /var/www/html/global/web/modules/contrib/kontainer/js/kontainer.js
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOUND 7 ERRORS AFFECTING 5 LINES
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "NULL" but found "null"
7 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "FALSE" but found "false"
28 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "NULL" but found "null"
34 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "TRUE" but found "true"
63 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "NULL" but found "null"
63 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "NULL" but found "null"
63 | ERROR | [x] TRUE, FALSE and NULL must be uppercase; expected "NULL" but found "null"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHPCBF CAN FIX THE 7 MARKED SNIFF VIOLATIONS AUTOMATICALLY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Time: 3.75 secs; Memory: 12MB

Thanks for the extra review! Yeah, this is in the JS file, but you can't write FALSE, TRUE and NULL upper case in JS, so this Drupal standard should be ignored for the Javascript file, DrupalPractice doesn't return any errors for it also.

manual review:

1. rote kontainer.delete_media_types: this is vulnerable to CSRF exploits as this is a destructive operation. You need to protect the route with a CSRF token or confirmation form.
2. KontainerAuth::authenticate(): this is vulnerable to timing attacks. When comparing secret strings you need to use the hash_equals() function instead of "===".
3. KontainerReferenceItemWidget::formElement(): there should be a way to generate URLs with manually setting up the CSRF token. If you use the normal URL generator it should spit out the URL including the CSRF token, as Drupal knows that the route should be CSRF protected.
4. kontainer.create_media: This route is missing access control? What permission does the user need to create media? The CSRF token is not an access protection, it is a validation of user intent. Looks like an access bypass vulnerability.

Please fix the 3 security vulnerabilities and check your code for other similar issues. And please don't remove the security tag, we keep that for statistics and to show examples of security problems.

Thank you very much for the review!

I have some questions/information about your points:

4. I didn't put any access requirements to the route definition in the routing.yml file, because I check this dynamically in code (see checkAccess function in KontainerService.php, which is called in the createEntities function in the controller for this route). I did this, because the media type is fetched dynamically from the JSON response each time from the Kontainer DAM, or decided based on the module configurations (if CDN is set as media source, then it is set to this value which is not in the response from the JSON.) So I would leave this as it is, if you do not see it as an access bypass vulnerability, based on this explanation.

3. I am not exactly sure what I need to do here. I am generating the CSRF token based on the route path, then I add this token to the ajaxTrustedUrl drupalSettings, where the token is added as a query parameter to the media path only (and not the URL), and I also add It to custom drupalSettings. Then in the Javascript library, where the actual call to the route is made ( url: Drupal.url(url) + '?token=' + drupalSettings.kontainer.token,) I build the URL from the values, that are generated in the widget class. I was doing this based on this example here: https://drupal.stackexchange.com/questions/221251/generating-url-with-csrf-token

So what I see that I could change here is to actually generate the URL object in the widget class by adding the CSRF token as the URL query parameter directly to the object, and then add this URL object to the drupalSettings, instead of building the URL in the Javascript library with Drupal.url(). But the CSRF token generation would stay as it is. Is this the direction, that you are pointing me to? If not, could you please provide me an explanation or an example, that would lead me in the right direction? Thanks!

Points 1 and 2 are clear to me. I will push those fixes by the end of this week, but I would again kindly ask you to provide some information on the above two points, when you have some time (I am putting the application back to Needs review, so you see my questions, even though I didn't push any changes yet).

Thank you again for the feedback!

I have now pushed the changes for points 1. and 2. from the above list, and explained number 4. in my above comment. I understand, that those were the 3 security issues that were mandatory to fix. If I need to do something on point 3 from the list, please read my above questions and point me in the right direction. Otherwise, I think this is ready for review now.

Thanks for the fixes!

kontainer.create_media: ah I see, did not see the access check later in the service. I would recommend to untangle that and do the access checking explicitly on the routing layer, then there is a lower risk that this gets lost in a refactoring for example.

Generating URLs with CSRF token: it works like this, which you can use similarliy for your ajaxTurstedUrl

use Drupal\Core\Url;
$route_name = 'system.run_cron';
$url = Url::fromRoute($route_name);
print $url->toString();

Which will output /admin/reports/status/run-cron?token=QJoWTyS5Bcf8KP_gvhmjUwm-s1rlrvSqL3XHgVsxEKQ
Or do you need to CSRF token standalone for some reason? It is only every useful in combination with the path?

src/Authentication/Provider/KontainerAuth.php: hash_equals(): Caution: It is important to provide the user-supplied string as the second parameter, rather than the first. You are doing that wrong. But I think it is very hard to exploit this with a timing attack, so would consider this a security hardening and not a security blocker.

Otherwise looks good to me!

Thanks for your contribution, Domen!

I updated your account so you can opt into security advisory coverage now.

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Thanks to the dedicated reviewer(s) as well.

Thank you so much for the explanations! I can say, that I learned something new and useful from this application :)

Thank you again for your time!

Automatically closed - issue fixed for 2 weeks with no activity.